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ABSTRACT
Reading and writing memory are, besides computation, the most
common operations a processor performs. The correctness of these
operations is therefore essential for the proper execution of any
program. However, as soon as fault attacks are considered, assuming
that the hardware performs its memory operations as instructed is
not valid anymore. In particular, attackers may induce faults with
the goal of reading or writing incorrectly addressed memory, which
can have various critical safety and security implications.
In this work, we present a solution to this problem and propose
a new method for protecting every memory access inside a pro-
gram against address tampering. The countermeasure comprises
two building blocks. First, every pointer inside the program is re-
dundantly encoded using a multi-residue error detection code. The
redundancy information is stored in the unused upper bits of the
pointer with zero overhead in terms of storage. Second, load and
store instructions are extended to link data with the corresponding
encoded address from the pointer. Wrong memory accesses subse-
quently infect the data value allowing the software to detect the
error.
For evaluation purposes, we implemented our countermeasure
into a RISC-V processor, tested it on a FPGA development board,
and evaluated the induced overhead. Furthermore, a LLVM-based
C compiler has been modified to automatically encode all data
pointers, to perform encoded pointer arithmetic, and to emit the
extended load/store instructions with linking support. Our evalua-
tions show that the countermeasure induces an average overhead of
10 % in terms of code size and 7 % regarding runtime, which makes
it suitable for practical adoption.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security andprivacy→Tamper-proof and tamper-resistant
designs; Embedded systems security;
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1 INTRODUCTION
A memory access is a highly critical operation. Many decisions
inside a program rely on the correct execution of a memory access.
Password checks, signature verification, or grants to a privileged
function they all rely on the genuine execution of a memory access.
Under normal operating conditions, amemory access reads/writes
from/to the desired location and random malfunctions, e.g., caused
by cosmic radiation [4], are comparably rare. However, the situa-
tion changes dramatically as soon as intentionally induced faults,
via so-called fault attacks, are considered. Here, the attacker modi-
fies the state of a computing device by, e.g., inducing glitches on
the voltage supply or the clock signal [2] or by shooting with a
laser on the chip [30]. Such a fault attack is capable of skipping
instructions [6], redirecting the memory access [9], or flipping bits
in registers or memory leading to a critical attack vector [11]. While
this type of attack requires local access to the device to induce a
fault, more advanced attacks can even induce faults remotely. For
example, the Rowhammer effect [16], which modifies the state of
the memory by frequently accessing neighboring memory cells,
can also be induced in software via Javascript [12] or remotely over
a network interface [18, 31].
While a fault may not directly reveal sensitive information, differ-
ent techniques have been developed to exploit faulty computation.
For example, it has been shown that it is possible to deduce the
secret key in various cryptographic algorithms [1, 5] solely by
analyzing the faulty computation output. Subsequently, a lot of
research has been performed to protect specific cryptographic al-
gorithms against fault attacks [3, 27]. However, the hardening of
general purpose software against fault attacks is a young research
area.
Two complementary subareas exist. The first subarea deals with
the protection of the executed code. The respective techniques [8,
29, 35] typically enforce control-flow integrity (CFI), which is also a
well-known mitigation strategy against software attacks, with fine
granularity. The resulting countermeasures ensure that executed
instructions and branches are genuine and that they are processed
in the correct sequence without omission.
The second subarea mainly deals with the protection of data.
There, well-known redundancy-based techniques like arithmetic
codes [7, 19, 26, 28] are utilized. In these schemes, the data is en-
coded into a redundant domain, where faults are detectable up to a
certain number of bit flips. Interestingly, while such schemes were
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initially developed to protect the data while it is stored in the mem-
ory, arithmetic codes also support to perform certain arithmetic
operations on the encoded value.
However, even when mechanisms of the two subareas are com-
bined, i.e., a system implements a CFI protection mechanism and
redundantly encodes the data, memory transfers from the proces-
sor via the memory subsystem are still vulnerable to fault attacks.
Namely, when a fault modifies the address on one of the buses dur-
ing the read or write operation, the data is read or written from/to
the wrong memory location, which is not trivially detectable given
that the data is unmodified. Similar effects can be triggered by in-
jecting faults into pointers, which are typically not prevented by
these schemes.
Unfortunately, current extensions to data encoding, which aim
to solve this issue, are very costly and impose severe restrictions
on the protected code. ANB-codes [28], for example, introduce a
tremendous runtime overhead of 90 % on average on top of already
expensive AN-codes, solely to solve the memory access problem.
Furthermore, they can only protect a limited set of variables with
well-known memory alignment and size. More efficient and less re-
strictive approaches are needed to protect memory accesses against
address tampering.
Contribution
In this work, we address the issue of unprotected memory accesses
in the context of fault attacks. We propose a practical solution to
detect address tampering in pointers and on memory buses. Our
generic approach works independently of the used code and data
protection schemes and therefore can effectively be combined with
state-of-the-art techniques in the context of hardening general
purpose computing against fault attacks.
In detail, the contributions of this paper are as follows. First,
we present a new approach to protect pointers against faults with
negligible overhead in terms of runtime and storage requirements.
We encode pointers using a multi-residue arithmetic code, which
allows us to detect faults on encoded pointers during both storage
and computation. The redundancy information of the code word is
hereby stored in the unused upper bits of a pointer to fully utilize
the available register space and yield zero-overhead for storing an
encoded pointer. Furthermore, by transforming the pointer arith-
metic into the encoded multi-residue domain, the protection of the
pointer is maintained also when performing arithmetic operations
on the pointer; e.g., when adding an offset to the stack pointer.
Second, we propose an efficient way to protect memory accesses
from tampering by linking the stored data in memory with the
address of the access. We establish this link whenever data is writ-
ten to the memory and remove the link as soon as the data is read
back into the processor. When considering fault attacks, counter-
measures like data encoding are already necessarily employed. By
linking the redundant address information with the encoded data,
faults during addressing manifest as errors in the redundantly en-
coded data, where they can be detected. As the result, data integrity
checks implicitly also checks for address tampering and make ex-
plicit addressing error checks unnecessary.
Finally, to evaluate the concept, we integrated our protection
mechanism into an FPGA hardware implementation of an open-
source RISC-V processor. Furthermore, to avoid tedious manual
encoding of all pointers and addresses inside the program, we inte-
grated this concept directly into a LLVM-based C compiler, which
is capable of automatically protecting complex codebases without
manual interference. The resulting prototype induces 10 % code
size and less than 7% runtime overhead on average.
Outline
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 dis-
cusses the threat model and the attack vector, gives an introduction
to arithmetic codes, and discusses related work. In Section 3, we de-
scribe how we protect pointers against fault attacks. The approach
to link the pointer protection with data encoding is presented in Sec-
tion 4. Section 5 details howwe extend the RISC-V instruction set to
support encoded pointers and discusses our compiler modifications.
Finally, Section 6 evaluates the overhead and Section 7 concludes
this work.
2 STATE OF THE ART AND BACKGROUND
In this section, we first describe the attack vector and the threat
model we consider. Furthermore, we present state-of-the-art meth-
ods of error detection codes, which we use to protect a memory
access against tampering efficiently. We also show related concepts,
which aim to secure pointers or a memory access in general.
2.1 Threat Model and Attack Vector
For this work, we assume a powerful attacker, which performs fault
attacks in order to compromise a system. Faults can be induced
into instructions and data at various places like, for example, in
registers, during computation in the ALU, on buses, and in memory.
Many of these attack vectors can be covered by existing and estab-
lished countermeasures, which we assume to be in place. Namely,
CFI-based fault countermeasures [8, 29, 35], which enforce the au-
thenticity of instructions as well as their execution sequence, can
be used to protect code against faults. Furthermore, such a CFI
scheme already protects function pointers, which do not require
further protection. Data, on the other hand, can be protected dur-
ing computation and storage using data encoding techniques like,
for example, arithmetic codes [7, 19, 26, 28]. However, as soon as
data is transferred via a memory bus these codes are insufficient.
Namely, while the value itself is protected via the code, the cor-
responding address information remains vulnerable. Furthermore,
pointers as such, typically, also remain unprotected by the data
encoding schemes considering that eventually the plain value of
the pointer is used to address the memory.
To illustrate the problem, Figure 1 visualizes a simple memory
access. On the left side there is the pointer used for a memory
access, on the right side there is the memory, and the arrow in
between denotes the memory access. The data in the memory is
redundantly encoded denoted by the c-subscript of the variables.
Originally, the pointer p points to the address 0x1001 to readout the
value falsec from the memory. However, a fault can manipulate the
memory access to readout a wrong value. In particular, there are
two error sources, which can lead to a wrong memory access. First,
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Figure 1: Attack vector: Modified pointers and manipulated
memory accesses.
the attacker can modify the pointer as shown in the middle example
in Figure 1. If a pointer gets modified, then all subsequent memory
accesses lead to a wrong location. An attacker could, e.g., modify
two pointers used for a signature comparison to point to the same
location, which always bypasses the memory comparison. This can
occur anywhere in the program, also during pointer arithmetic.
The second source of a manipulated memory access is the memory
operation itself. When assuming the pointer is correct and not
manipulated, the memory access can still be manipulated. A fault
on the address bus can redirect the memory access to a wrong
location as indicated in the third example.
Both of these attack vectors can lead to a wrong memory access.
Today, there is no efficient way to protect them leaving frequently
used memory operations completely unprotected against fault at-
tacks.
2.2 Error Detection Codes
Error detection codes [23] are a well-known and well-studied con-
cept to detect errors during storage or transmission. However, dif-
ferent types of code have been developed, which also support the
computation on encoded data. Logical operations, for example, can
directly be computed in the encoded domain when binary linear
codes [13] are used. Arithmetic codes, on the other hand, can be
used when primarily arithmetic operations have to be performed
on encoded data.
2.2.1 AN(B)-Codes. AN-codes [7, 10] are an example for such an
arithmetic code and are defined by multiplying the functional value
x with the encoding constant A: xc = x · A. Therefore, all code
words are multiples of the encoding constant A and every value in
between corresponds to an invalid code word. To check if a code
word is valid, a modulo operation with the encoding constant is
performed, which must yield zero. Decoding is done by using an
integer division with the encoding constant. Because of multiply-
ing the functional value with the encoding constant, it cannot be
separated from the redundancy part, thus the name non-separable
code. The encoding constant A defines the error detection capabil-
ities. Finding a good encoding constant is not easy and currently
only possible via exhaustive search [21]. Research already found
suitable encoding constants, which maximize the error detection
capabilities, so-called Super A [14]. To maintain the error detection
capabilities, the functional value needs to be less than the encoding
constant, which limits the general-purpose application of this code
in real-world applications. Furthermore, this type of code does not
protect the address in a memory access.
Forin and Schiffel et al. [10, 28] extend AN-codes by assigning a
variable dependent signature Bx to each encoded variable xc . This
yields the encoding formula xc = A ·x +Bx with Bx < A. By adding
the variable dependent signature Bx to the AN-code, the AN-code
property that all encoded values are a multiple of A is intentionally
destroyed. Since Bx is less than A, decoding works the same as
for normal AN-codes using an integer division. A check is also
performed using a modulo operation with the encoding constant,
which now must yield the signature Bx . A compiler keeps track of
all assigned signatures and is able to insert checks for the modified
ANB code words. By assigning a variable-dependent signature to
the code words, a wrong memory access can be detected, as long
as signatures do not cancel out due to arithmetic. However, this
approach turns out to be complicated in practice. On the one hand,
ANB-codes have a performance penalty of 90 % on average on top
of AN-codes. On the other hand, the value of the signature Bx needs
to be less than the encoding constant which limits the number of
variables to be encoded.
2.2.2 Residue Codes. A different class of arithmetic codes are
residue codes [19]. Here, a residue code word xc is defined by the
tuple xc = (x , rx = M |x), where x denotes the functional value and
rx the residue. The residue rx is hereby computed as the remainder
M |x with respect to the code modulusM . Residue codes separate
the redundancy part from the functional value x and therefore
are called separable codes. Although the modulus M defines the
robustness of the code, ordinary residue codes only guarantee the
detection of a single bit flip, because a single bit flip on the data and
on the residue is enough to construct a new, valid code word (e.g.,
the Hamming distance between the 0c and 1c is two, where both
values denote a residue encoding with an arbitrary modulusM).
In order to overcome this limitation and to scale the robustness of
the code, the redundancy part can be increased by using more than
one residue [25, 26], yielding a multi-residue code. The modulus
M is now defined byM = {m0, . . . ,mn }, where n is the number of
residues.
Finding the set of moduli is not easy. Although finding good
moduli requires exhaustive search [21], the moduli selection for
multi-residue codes can be done faster than for AN-codes. Residue
codes, in general, are arithmetic codes and therefore also support
certain arithmetic operations. Here, the operation is performed on
the functional part and on the residues independently. Equation 1
shows how an addition works for two multi-residue encoded val-
ues. The addition is performed on the functional value and on the
residues independently. On the residues, the addition is performed
followed by a modular reduction using on the modulimi for the
ith residue.
zc = xc + yc =
(
x + y,∀i :mi | (ri,x + ri,y ) ) (1)
Similar to the addition, residue codes also support subtractions
and multiplications. However, in this work, we only use additions
and subtractions.
2.3 ARM Pointer Authentication
Protecting pointers against tampering is not only relevant in the
context of fault attacks but is also used to counteract software
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attacks. For example, ARM added a feature called pointer authenti-
cation (PAC) [24] to the ARM v8.3 instruction set with the goal of
protecting special pointers. Several new instructions were added
to the architecture that permits to cryptographically authenticate
special pointer values in registers, like the return address in the
link register, using a message authentication code (MAC). PAC
tags have a size between 3 and 31 bits, depending on the processor
configuration, and are, as in our work, directly embedded into the
protected pointer.
Note, however, that even though the general approach is similar
to our work, the provided capabilities and the resulting protec-
tion is vastly different. PAC aims to only protect special pointers
against software attacks. In PAC, authenticated pointers cannot be
be protected during pointer arithmetic since there is no homomor-
phism for the MAC. Furthermore, PAC only aims to protect the
pointer. The memory access, which uses an authenticated pointer
is completely unprotected and there are no protection mechanisms
to ensure that the accessed memory actually originates from the
correct address.
3 POINTER PROTECTIONWITH RESIDUE
CODES
Manipulation of a memory access is possible by attacking two
different parts of the access. The first one is the pointer itself, which
is used to perform the memory access. This section details how
we use multi-residue codes to protect every data pointer inside
a program against fault attacks. Furthermore, we present how to
integrate the multi-residue code into our pointer representation
and elaborate on the additionally needed hardware support.
3.1 Overview
Pointers are ubiquitous. Every memory access, e.g., accessing a vari-
able on the stack, uses a pointer to address the memory. However,
when considering fault attacks, pointers may be manipulated to
point to a different memory location.
To counteract this threat, we encode all pointers to a redundant
representation, where faults are detectable. As presented previously,
there are two classes of suitable codes: separable and non-separable
codes, which have similar properties in terms of error detection
capabilities and support for computation. However, a separable
code has advantages to protect a pointer. Namely, it supports direct
access to the functional value and can therefore immediately be used
to address memory. On the other hand, using a non-separable code
to protect the pointer requires to perform a potentially expensive
decoding operation before the actual address is available. AN-codes,
as an example for non-separable codes, require a costly integer
division during the decoding operation. Hence, this division would
be required for every memory access.
We encode pointers using a separable multi-residue code with a
scalable number of moduli. Here, an encoded pointer pc is denoted
as a tuple (p, rp ), where p is the original value of the pointer and rp
denotes the redundancy part comprising the residues of p given a
moduli setM . Using amulti-residue code to protect the pointer gives
two advantages. On the one hand, the strength of the code, i.e., the
number of bit flips which are detectable, is scalable with the number
of residues. On the other hand, residue codes are arithmetic codes
and therefore also support arithmetic instructions, like addition and
subtraction, natively. This allows us to perform pointer arithmetic,
for example, the stack pointer manipulation in function prologues
and epilogues, directly inside the encoded domain without decoding
the pointer.
3.2 Pointer Layout and Residue-Code Selection
Adding separable redundancy to data implies that the additional
information needs to be stored somewhere in order to provide a
value. In the context of protecting a processor register, various
possibilities exist to provide this storage.
For example, an additional parallel register file can be added
to the processor, which only holds the redundancy part and gets
updated in lockstep with the actual values [20]. However, this ap-
proach is quite costly for our use case considering that only a small
number of registers typically hold pointers at a certain point in time.
Alternatively, pairs of regular registers can be used to store the data
and its redundancy. Unfortunately, doing so increases the register
pressure and lowers the overall performance. Moreover, without
adding costly access ports to the register file, multiple instructions
have to be performed on every pointer operation, even for simple
ones like an increment. Finally, at least for modern RISC instruction
set architectures (ISA) [34], adding additional operands into the
instruction encoding is difficult without increasing the instruction
size.
In this work, we therefore went with a different approach and
stored the redundancy information directly into the upper bits of
the pointer. Similar to PAC, i.e., ARM’s pointer authentication fea-
ture, this approach introduces zero overhead in terms of storage
for the redundancy at the cost of some bits of address space. Ad-
ditionally, this dense representation of an encoded pointer allows
us to add new combined residue arithmetic instructions, which
operate on the functional value and on the residues in parallel,
rather than requiring separate instructions to handle both. By stor-
ing the redundant pointer in one register, we can, therefore, use
the same instruction format as regular instructions and do not re-
quire extensive modifications of the ISA or hardware to maintain
performance.
Considering that the directly accessible address space is limited,
embedding the residues into the pointer works best for modern
64-bit architectures. Therefore, the following design considerations
as well as our prototype, that is presented in Section 5, is built upon
such an architecture. The overall concept can still be applied to
32-bit architectures with reduced error detection capabilities or via
a different storage option.
Parameter Selection. When selecting the parameters of an error
detecting code, it is always a trade-off between error detection ca-
pabilities and the overhead introduced by the code. However, since
the functional value including the redundancy is stored in a single
register, also the remaining address space has to be considered. For
our prototype, we focus on a 64-bit architecture and partition our
pointers into 24-bit redundancy and a 40-bit functional value. The
resulting pointers can still address one terabyte of memory, which
is sufficient for most applications.
As a concrete code, we instantiate a multi-residue code with the
moduli setM = {5, 7, 17, 31, 127}, which is an extension to the one
Pointing in the Right Direction - Securing Memory Accesses in a Faulty World ACSAC ’18, December 3–7, 2018, San Juan, PR, USA
63 55 51 46 43 40 39 0
r4,p r3,p r2,p r1,p r0,p
M
M
IO p
Figure 2: Encoded pointer representation. The actual 40-bit
pointer value p, the MMIO tag bit, and 23 bits of redundancy
rp comprise an encoded 64-bit pointer.
presented in [20]. This moduli set yields a code with a Hamming
distance of D = 5 and is capable of detecting up to four bit flips
in the encoded 64-bit pointer value. Storing the residues for these
moduli requires a total of 23 bits, i.e, 3, 3, 5, 5, 7 bits, respectively.
The last remaining bit is used as a tag bit and specifies if data
accessed via the pointer have to perform data linking/unlinking as
presented later in Section 4.3. The resulting register layout of such
an encoded pointer is shown in Figure 2.
3.3 Pointer Operations
Pointers are not only used to perform a memory access but also
are used to perform pointer arithmetic. To maintain good perfor-
mance, it is therefore vital that the encoded pointers support these
computations as efficiently as possible. Notably, as the term pointer
arithmetic already hints, arithmetic computations, like addition and
subtraction, are the most common operations that are performed on
pointers. For example, accessing larger sequential memory chunks
via a pointer involves a large number of additions between the
pointer and the access stride in a loop. Similarly, next to every func-
tion call, the respective stack frame size is added and subtracted
to/from the stack pointer in the function’s prologue and epilogue.
Precisely these types of operations are natively supported by the
used multi-residue code and can therefore be performed in the
encoded domain.
On the other hand, more work is required for operations that
are not directly supported by the multi-residue code. The simplest
approach is probably to perform the operation on the plain func-
tional value only and restore the encoding afterward. To ensure the
correctness of the computation, then additional measures like repli-
cation have to be used. Alternatively, such operations can be per-
formed by first converting the pointer to a different code, in which
the computations are straightforward, followed by converting the
differently encoded result back into multi-residue representation.
Still, such operations comprise only a very small number of pointer
operations compared to arithmetic operations.
Software vs. Hardware. In a multi-residue code, the addition op-
eration is performed on the functional value and on all its residues.
This operation can be executed in hardware or software. However,
performing this operation in software is challenging, as it involves
a modulo reduction for each residue.
Looking only at a single modulo, there exist several options for
implementing the reduction in software: First, a normal modulo
instruction from the ISA can be used. Although such an instruction
does not have much code overhead, a modulo operation involves a
costly integer division which usually takes multiple clock cycles
to finish. Second, instead of a modulo operation, a conditional
subtraction can be used for the modular reduction. Third, there are
optimized modulo algorithms available [15], but their overhead is
still large. A single modular addition with an optimized reduction
with the modulus five takes at least 18 instructions on our RISC-V
target architecture.
Considering that the runtime of these solutions additionally has
to be multiplied with the number of used residues makes a software
solution even less attractive. Furthermore, even if the performance
penalty is acceptable, additional registers have to be reserved for
implementing the reduction functionality. Summarizing, a software-
based approach to perform residue operations, while feasible, is not
very practical. Therefore, hardware based approaches to implement
the residue operations have been investigated.
In particular, in our prototype, we add new instructions that per-
mit to perform addition and subtraction of multi-residue encoded
pointers. Section 5.1 discusses the new instructions in detail with
the focus on the target architecture. Furthermore, an instruction
for performing the expensive encoding operation is added, which
computes the modulus for each residue. For convenience reasons,
also a dedicated decoding operation is added to the ISA.
4 EVOLVED MEMORY ACCESS PROTECTION
Apart from faulting the pointer, the second source to manipulate
a memory access is the memory operation itself. If the attacker is
able to induce faults on the address bus, the memory access can
be redirected to a different location. In this section, we present a
method to link the data with its respective address, where address-
ing errors are transformed into data errors which can subsequently
be detected using a data-protection scheme.
4.1 Overview
In order to be able to detect address tampering, a way to uniquely
identify incorrectly accessed memory is needed. A common ap-
proach to establish this link between the data and the address is
augmenting the data-protection scheme, which is anyway needed
to protect the data against faults.
For example, ANB-codes embed the identity of the variable, in
the form of a unique residueBx , into a required underlying AN-code
based data encoding. However, this approach has several drawbacks.
For example, working on variable granularity requires concise data-
flow information, which is in real-world applications hard to acquire
for arbitrary memory operations, and limits the applicability of
the approach. Furthermore, maintaining these identities during
calculation is quite costly. Finally, the approach is strongly linked
with AN-codes and cannot easily be applied to other data-protection
schemes.
Our scheme, takes an entirely different approach to prevent
address tampering. Instead of constructively embedding the address
of the data into the data-protection code, our scheme destructively
overlays data that is written to the memory with the respective
memory address. As a result, addressing errors are transformed into
data errors that get detectable as soon as the overlay is removed
again.
In more detail, before data is written from a register to the mem-
ory bus by the processor, the data gets encoded with respect to
the target address. Conceptually, this kind of linking is similar to
encrypting the data in an address dependent way. However, since
we do not strive for confidentiality with our approach, the use
of a cryptographically secure cipher is not needed. The resulting
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encoded data is then simply stored into memory like in a regular
system.
When data is read back from memory into a processor regis-
ter, the decoding with respect to the target address is performed.
Considering that the performed decoding operation is the inverse
of the encoding, a genuine data value is restored only when the
read has been performed from the correct address. Otherwise, an
incorrect data value is generated which can be detected via the used
data-protection scheme. Note that the detection of address tamper-
ing during memory writes is possible like this as well. However,
the detection is delayed to the point where the incorrectly written
value is read back into the processor.
4.2 The Linking Approach
As already mentioned, the general idea behind our memory access
protection approach is to link the data that is stored in memory with
its respective address. Instead of directly writing a register value
DReд into memory at the a certain address p (i.e., mem [p] = DReд ),
a little more work has to be performed in our scheme. Namely, as
shown in Equation 2, the linking function l has to be evaluated in
order to determine the value that is actually written to the memory
at address p.
mem [p] = l
(
p,DReд
)
= lp
(
DReд
)
(2)
The purpose of this linking function is to combine the address p
with the data value DReд . However, not every function can be used
for this purpose. At the very least, the following two requirements
have to be fulfilled in this context. First, for each address p, the link-
ing function lp has to be a permutation. Having this property means
that lp performs a bijective mapping and that an inverse function
l−1p exists, i.e., ∀p,DReд → l−1p
(
lp
(
DReд
))
= DReд . Subsequently,
memory read operations can be implemented using this inverse
function as shown in Equation 3. As the result, from the software
perspective, encoding data when storing to memory and decoding
data when loading from memory is completely transparent, yields
the expected result, and can be performed for every memory access.
DReд = l
−1 (p, mem [p]) = l−1p (mem [p]) (3)
Second, to ensure that addressing faults are detectable, data
encoded under one address should yield a modified value when
being decoded under a different address, i.e., ∀p,p′,DReд : p ,
p′ → l−1p′
(
lp
(
DReд
))
, DReд . Note, furthermore, that the mod-
ified value should not be a valid code word in terms of the used
data-protection code.
Function Selection. Various functions, like for example crypto-
graphic ciphers, fulfill these requirements and are therefore suitable
to link the data and the address information as required by the mem-
ory access protection scheme. However, given that we aim for a
low-overhead design, less resource demanding functions have been
investigated.
Interestingly, already a simply xor operation, as shown in Equa-
tion 4 and Equation 5, is sufficient as the linking function for our
use case. In more detail, in our scheme, addresses are encoded us-
ing arithmetic multi-residue codes and the data encoding can be
selected arbitrarily. On the one hand, when the same multi-residue
code is also used for the data, e.g., an encoded pointer is written
to memory, using the xor operation is good choice given that that
multi-residue codes are not closed under the xor operation. Subse-
quently, it is also unlikely that combining multiple valid code words
yields a valid result and therefore facilitates error detection. On the
other hand, even when a data protection code which is closed under
the xor operation is used, still similar error detection capabilities
are expected. After all, combining code words from different codes
is highly unlikely to yield sensible results.
mem [p] = p ⊕ DReд (4)
DReд = p ⊕ mem [p] (5)
Linking Granularity. Theoretically, the previously described link-
ing approach can be applied with arbitrarily granularity. Therefore,
applying the technique on the processor’s native word size, e.g.,
64-bit in our prototype, may appear natural. However, performing
xor-based linking on such a coarse granularity does not yield the
desired amount of diffusion. Namely, bytes that are close to each
other, i.e., with a stride of 8 bytes when operating on 64-bit, are
highly likely to have the same address pad. Furthermore, in many
real-world applications, also misaligned data accesses with arbi-
trary size have to be supported efficiently. Situations like this, for
example, commonly arise when arbitrarily aligned data is copied
via the memcpy function.
Therefore, to fix the problem of the low diffusion and the arbi-
trarily aligned data accesses, we perform the linking of data and
address with byte-wise granularity. Each byte, even when it is part
of a larger memory transfer, is independently linked with its re-
spective address. Hereby, each individual byte-address pointer is
still multi-residue encoded to provide the desired diffusion during
linking. Furthermore, the actual linking is again performed via an
xor similar to Equation 4. However, considering that the data and
its address have different bit sizes, an additional compression is
applied on the address before linking. Namely, each 64-bit address
p = [p0,p1, . . . ,p7] gets reduced to an one byte value p′ by xor-ing
the individual address bytes as shown in Equation 6.
p′ =
7⊕
i=0
pi (6)
Applying this approach to a full 64-bit word is visualized in Fig-
ure 3. Considering the number of needed multi-residue operations
for such a word-sized access, using this linking scheme effectively
requires hardware support. In this work, we therefore integrated
the needed transformations directly into special load and store
instructions. From the software perspective, encoding data when
storing to memory and decoding data when loading from memory
is completely transparent and can be performed for next to every
memory access.
4.3 Memory-Mapped I/O
Memory-mapped I/O (MMIO) is a common communication inter-
face in embedded processors to access peripherals. In MMIO, the
peripheral registers are mapped into the standard memory layout
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Figure 3: Byte-wise data linking of a 64-bit word. Each byte
gets xored with its respective xor-reduced encoded address.
of the processor. This allows the CPU to use ordinary load and store
instructions to access the peripheral.
However, in order to protect the memory access, our architec-
ture uses redundant pointers and links them with the data before
executing the memory access. Since a standard memory-mapped
peripheral is not aware of this data linking, wrong data would be
written to the device. Therefore, we cannot apply data linking when
accessing a memory-mapped peripheral. However, we still can use
an encoded pointer to access the memory-mapped peripheral as
this does not influence the data. In order to use an encoded pointer
but not perform the data linking, we would need special instruc-
tions for load and store for this purpose. We avoid this overhead by
encoding this information directly into the encoded pointer. The
load and store instructions detect this and do not perform the data
linking accordingly.
As shown in Section 3, we redundantly encode the pointer us-
ing a multi-residue code. In Figure 2, we show the pointer layout
where the 41st MMIO-bit indicates whether the pointer is for an
MMIO access without data linking. The residues, which form the
redundancy of the pointer, are computed over the 40-bit functional
pointer value and the MMIO-bit to protect both against tampering.
5 ARCHITECTURE
The concept of protected pointers and linked memory accesses is
integrated in a prototype implementation based on a 64-bit RISC-V
architecture. In this section we first discuss the new instructions,
show how we integrated them into the architecture, and finally
show a compiler prototype to automatically protect all memory
accesses in a program.
5.1 New Instructions
As previously described, it requires hardware support to efficiently
perform the residue arithmetic such that the performance penalty
is acceptable. In this work, we extend the instruction set of the
processor with instructions that operate in the encoded residue
domain. In particular, the following custom instructions are added
to the instruction set.
renc, rdec. To efficiently encode a value into the multi-residue
domain, a dedicated encoding instruction (renc) is added. The en-
coding operation computes the residues over the 41-bit functional
value of the pointer, which also includes the MMIO-bit in the pro-
tection domain. As a second instruction, we add support to decode a
multi-residue encoded register (rdec). Both instructions are idempo-
tent, meaning they can repeatedly be executed (encoding an already
encoded value does not change the encoding).
radd, raddi, rsub. To support pointer arithmetic on encoded point-
ers, hardware support for the most commonly used operations is
added. Concretely, we support adding two multi-residue encoded
register values (radd), adding a multi-residue encoded value to an
immediate value (raddi), and subtracting multi-residue encoded
values (rsub). The immediate value in the raddi instruction is not
yet multi-residue encoded. However, these values are part of the
instruction encoding and are already protected via the CFI code
protection scheme. Note that, before the immediate can be used
in a residue operation, it gets encoded as part of the instruction
execution.
rlxck, rsxck. Since we now use encoded pointers and require
data linking/unlinking, dedicated memory instructions are added
to the ISA. Therefore, a family of new load (rlxck) and store (rsxck)
instructions is added. Herby, the x denotes the access granularity
of the memory operation. Concretely, we support byte (b), half-
word (h), word (w), and double word (d) accesses with and without
sign extension, which corresponds to the original memory access
instructions in the RISC-V 64-bit ISA. The new instructions have
the same operand interface as the original load and store instruc-
tions of RISC-V. However, they now take an encoded pointer for
addressing the memory. The memory instructions also contain a
plain immediate value to add an offset to the pointer, which is pro-
tected by the CFI code protection. Furthermore, these instructions
perform the data linking and unlinking on a byte-wise granularity.
However, if the 40th-bit, theMMIO bit, is set to one, no data linking
and unlinking is performed, which allows us to use a protected
pointer when accessing a memory location, which does not support
data linking, e.g., a memory-mapped peripheral.
Since every memory access is replaced with its protected coun-
terpart, the protection mechanism could already be implemented in
the original load and store instructions of the processor. However,
for the sake of still supporting the original RISC-V instructions, they
are left unmodified, and new instructions are added separately.
5.2 Hardware
The instruction set is only one part of our protected architecture.
We also implemented the modified instruction set in hardware. As
foundation, the open-source 32-bit RISC-V core RI5CY [33] is used.
This core is extended to a 64-bit processor meaning that the register
file, datapath, and load-and-store unit aremodified and all necessary
instructions are added to be compliant with the RISC-V RV64IM
instruction set. Furthermore, we added the new instructions to
deal with multi-residue encoded pointers, as defined in Section 5.1.
Figure 4 shows the modified processor pipeline, which includes
a dedicated arithmetic logical unit (ALU) for residue operations.
Furthermore, immediate values, which are part of the instruction,
get encoded during the instruction decode stage of the processor
pipeline. The load-and-store unit is extended to support data linking
and unlinking to protect all memory accesses.
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Figure 4: Modified processor pipeline. The instruction de-
code stage is extended with a 12-bit residue encoder, the ex-
ecution stage with a residue ALU, and the write-back stage
with a pointer-reduction data-linking unit.
Mod
Reduce
Res
Encode
Cmp
rs2
64
41
23
rs1
rs1
isRenc
isRenc
41
23
ResError
5
ResALU
Figure 5: Residue ALU with a 41-bit adder and a shared
residue encoder. The addition result is automatically
checked after the operation by re-encoding the result and
comparing it with the computed residues and generating a
redundant error signal.
The new residue ALU is shown in detail in Figure 5. The ALU
supports encoding and decoding of values to/from the multi-residue
domain as well as adding and subtracting two encoded values. The
design of the ALU is optimized to require only one residue adder
and one encoder in the execution stage of the processor. Decoding
is for free since it only requires rewiring, where the upper bits are
set to zero. After performing an addition, the functional value of the
adder result is re-encoded and compared with the independently
computed residues in order to perform error-checking after each
residue instruction. If the computed residues and the newly re-
encoded residues mismatch, a redundant error signal is generated
to force the processor into a safe state. Since this adder is also used
for computing the final pointer address during a memory access
(the encoded immediate value is added to the encoded base pointer),
every pointer is also checked before performing a memory access.
With frequent checks for every result, we minimize the probability
that error masking occurs and errors are not detectable anymore.
Currently, the residue encoder uses special algorithms from [22]
to encode data. However, the residue adder is implemented without
any further optimizations. By using optimized arithmetic opera-
tions, e.g., the one from [36], the hardware overhead can be further
reduced.
5.3 Software
To make the countermeasure practical and protect every memory
access in the program, the new instructions and the protection
mechanism also need to be integrated into the compiler. In the
following, we integrate our countermeasure to the LLVM-based C
compiler [17].
An LLVM-based compiler is partitioned into three parts, the front
end, the middle end, and the back end. While the middle end opti-
mizes target-independently on an intermediate code representation,
the back end transforms the universal intermediate representation
to a target-dependent code. To protect every memory access in the
program, the countermeasure needs to be inserted in the back end
stage of the compiler. Any earlier transformation can potentially
miss a memory access leaving some accesses possibly unprotected
(e.g., the stack is created in the target-dependent part of the back
end). Even in the back end, the protection happens right before the
final instruction scheduling.
LLVM’s back end uses a directed acyclic graph (DAG) represen-
tation, the Selection DAG, for the code generation. The intermediate
representation is transformed in a series of steps to finally emit the
machine code. However, the back end has no information about
pointers and addresses. Therefore, this information is created and
propagated manually on the Selection DAG. Dedicated pointer
nodes are added to the Selection DAG where pointers are created,
e.g., when creating a FrameIndex node used for a local stack mem-
ory access. This information is then propagated on the Selection
DAG and all dependent operations are replaced with their corre-
sponding residue counterpart. If we obtain an instruction, which
is not supported by the residue code, the pointer is decoded, the
operation is performed in the unencoded domain, and then, the
pointer is re-encoded. However, this sequence of instructions is not
used in the majority of the transformations. Finally, protected load
and store instructions are emitted, which use an encoded pointer
for addressing the memory.
If the program uses a constant address, e.g., the address of a
global variable, this information needs to be encoded to the multi-
residue domain. However, the compiler does not have this infor-
mation yet. Therefore, it creates a relocation such that the linker
can fill in the correct address information. Since this information
requires multi-residue encoding, the linker is also modified. In our
work, we use a custom RISC-V back end of LLVM’s lld linker. In
addition to resolving regular relocations, our linker also applies
multi-residual encoding to pointers in the binary. This includes
pointers synthesized in code as well as pointers stored in the mem-
ory, which additionally get linked with address information. Similar
to that, data stored in the read-only section of the binary is also
linked with its address. As soon as these values are loaded into a
register, the unlinking operation is performed and the correct value
is restored.
6 EVALUATION
In order to make a countermeasure usable in practice, the overhead
must be reasonable. In this section, we first show the introduced
hardware overhead and then evaluate different benchmark applica-
tions on the target architecture. Finally, we analyze the software
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Table 1: Code and runtime overhead for different bench-
mark programs from an HDL simulation.
Benchmark
Code Overhead Runtime Overhead
Baseline Overhead Baseline Overhead
[kB] [%] [kCycles] [%]
fir 4.26 8.54 39.22 6.35
fft 6.52 6.57 58.01 4.65
keccak 4.79 10.11 255.55 11.31
ipm 4.84 12.81 10.80 3.94
aes_cbc 7.25 8.77 60.91 9.10
conv2d 3.26 13.12 5.92 2.70
Average 9.99 6.34
overhead, discuss the overhead sources, and describe future opti-
mization possibilities.
To quantify the hardware overhead, we synthesize the hardware
architecture for a Xilinx Artix-7 series FPGA. By adding the new
instructions, a dedicated ALU for multi-residue operations, and
a modified load-and-store unit, the required number of lookup-
tables (LUTs) increases by less than 5%, and the number of flip-
flops increases by less than 1%. However, this prototype design
is implemented without optimizations leaving space to further
improve the design.
The custom LLVM toolchain based on LLVM 6.0 is used to com-
pile different benchmark applications for the RISC-V-based target
architecture. The benchmarks were taken from the PULPino reposi-
tory [32], which were used to originally evaluate the performance
of the RI5CY core. Simulation is performed using a cycle accurate
HDL simulation of the target processor. As baseline, we simulate
the benchmark applications solely with enabled CFI protection [35]
but without an application-specific data protection scheme. On
top of that baseline, we determine the exclusive overhead of our
countermeasure in terms of code size and runtime.
As shown in Table 1, on overage, the code overhead is 10 % and
the runtime overhead is less than 7%. This is a comparable bet-
ter performance to ANB-codes, which have an average runtime
overhead of 90 % compared to AN-codes solely to provide memory
access protection. Instead, our countermeasure has a considerable
lower overhead, making it attractive for many real-world applica-
tions.
6.1 Future Work
The overhead numbers are already competitive for practical usage.
Still, some improvements regarding code size or performance have
not been performed yet.
For example, pointer comparisons in the encoded domain are
currently only implemented for equal and not equal. Although sel-
domly used, comparisons with other predicates are still performed
on the functional value. Similarly, in are rare cases, when pointer
arithmetic uses unsupported logical operations, the operations is
performed on the functional value only. Adding support for these
operations further reduces the overhead and slightly increases the
protection domain.
Furthermore, our current toolchain has not been highly opti-
mized for our prototype architecture yet. We expect that, with a
more optimized compiler, even better results can be achieved in the
future.
7 CONCLUSION
Memory accesses are frequently used operations, and many differ-
ent security policies, as well as safety mechanisms, rely on their
correct execution. However, when dealing with faults, a correct-
ness of a memory access cannot be guaranteed. While there are
dedicated methods to protect the control-flow of a program and to
protect the data in memory and registers, there is no efficient pro-
tection mechanism to protect the memory access against address
tampering.
In this work, we closed this gap and presented a new mechanism
to protect memory accesses inside a program. The countermea-
sure is employed in two steps. First, all pointers including pointer
arithmetic are protected by employing a multi-residue code. The
redundancy is hereby directly stored inside the unused upper bits
of the pointer, which does not add any memory overhead. The sec-
ond step links the redundant pointer with the data. Subsequently,
addressing errors manifest as data errors and get detectable as soon
the data is loaded into the register. This linking approach is uni-
versally applicable and can be used on top of any data protection
scheme.
To demonstrate the practicability of our countermeasure, we
integrated the concept of protected memory accesses into a RISC-
V processor. We extended the instruction set to deal with multi-
residue encoded pointers and added newmemory operations which
perform the linking and unlinking step. Furthermore, we extended
the LLVM compiler to automatically transform all pointers of a
program to the encoded domain. Our evaluation showed an average
code overhead of 10 % and an average runtime overhead of less
than 7%, which makes this countermeasure practical for real-life
applications.
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